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Atmtract - - I f  every entity has a set of attr ibutes with each attr ibute having a value, we regard the 
complete set of an eatity's attribute-v,due pairs (e.8., color-red, heisht-4 era) as fully describing the 
entity. Such descriptions form a conceptual space, that is, an intensional space of concepts for which 
spatial inclusion corresponds to strict logical implication. An intensional losic of concepts is developed 
with which we can talk about concepts and their relations without referring to extensions of concepts. 
In this approach semantic networks are simply sets of interrelated formulas; i.e., they are theories 
in the logic of concepts. Default values are treated by introducing a new type of modal po~ibil~ty 
operator and a superconcept operator, not by revising the basic logical entailment relation. A concept 
may inherit values from a superconcept either strictly or by default as "concept qva superconcept." 
In this way inheritance problems turn out to be logical inference problems, and they can be solved 
in sound proof theory. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Semantic networks provide an important means to represent knowledge in artificial intelligence, 
but unfortunately their semantical nd epistemological foundations are quite unclear (see [1]). A 
central question is whether semantic networks are something like languages or perhaps omething 
like "mental conceptual structures." In this paper we shall clarify tile nature of semantic networks 
by taking, as our starting point, the classical doctrine of concepts as mental constructs. Such 
mental constructs form a conceptual space, a definite (lattice) structure of concepts. Semantic 
networks are representations of such conceptual spaces. But whereas in classical ogic concepts 
were primitive ntities, we shall here apply the attribute-value t chnique to specify the internal 
structure of concepts. We shall study conceptual spaces by using predicate logic. In the logical 
framework, semantic networks are theories and conceptual spaces are their models. Representa- 
tional schemas can be identified with the syntax of a logical system. We shall call our approach 
the conceptual space approach. A similar but more thorough system is developed in [2]. 
After the basic definitions, we shall present our view about inheritance and default values. We 
shall argue that default values are best seen as possible values of attributes. We introduce a new 
superconcept operation by which we can treat elegantly inheritance of properties. A major aim 
of the paper is to present a new logic of concept. Finally, some "paradoxes" of inheritance with 
default values will be solved. 
2. CONCEPTUAL SPACES 
In classical logic concepts are mental constructs which have a content and a scope. The basic 
relation between concepts is that of entailment: a concept z has a concept y as its characteristic 
or feature. We shall denote this relation by the sign ::~. For example, we can write 
horse :~ animal. (I) 
We read "x =~ y" as "z is necessarily y." It has been shown that one can interpret in a natural 
way the classical notion of conceptual structure, by assuming that the relation ::~ is a lattice 
order [2]. In particular, the following hold: 
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z=~y & y=~z ,x=~/ ,  (3) 
z=~y & y~-"  . . , z~z .  (4) 
Classical ogic does not specify the "microstructure" of concepts: concepts are taken as "indivisi- 
ble" entities. On the other hand, modern linguistics and, especially, artificial intelligence research 
has pointed out the importance of attribute-value analysis of concepts. 
Our aim is to integrate the classical doctrine of concepts and the recent attribute-value idea 
into a coherent logical foundation for semantic networks. Let us suppose that we are interested 
in a special field of reality and that we are able to describe every entity in the field by a set of 
attributes. We make an identification assumption to the effect that every entity of the field can 
be identified by these attributes. 
Let ATT be a set of attributes. Thus ATT may contain attributes like 'color,' 'weight,' length,' 
'form,' and 'identification umber.' We can describe every entity in the field by specifying the 
values of attributes it has. Let V be a set of values. V may contain numbers, colors like 'red,' 
'blue' and 'yellow,' forms like 'round,' 'square' and 'triangle,' etc. An attachment of values to 
every attribute in AT'/" is a total description of a possible entity of the field (see Figure 1). Such 
an attachment is a function f from the set AT'/" to the set V: 
f : ATT  -..-* V. (5) 
Thus one such function, regarded as a set of ordered pairs, could be: f = {(color, red), (form, 
round), (height in meters, 0.005), (price in dollars, $35) . . . .  }. The set of all such functions forms 
a Cartesian product. We shall call it a conceptual space S of the field: 





an entity x 
a field of reality 
Figure 1. Concept~ space and representation f entities. 
Tile term conceptual space is discussed in [2]. We shall call the structure 
B -" (ATT,  V) (7) 
a conceptual base. The conceptual base B determines totally the conceptual space S. If the 
number of attributes is finite, say n, then S is an n dimensional space. 
Concepts can now be identified with subsets of S. This definition of concepts is quite abstract, 
but it is natural because concepts are areas of conceptual space and they thus express restrictions 
(or determinations) of entities (Figure 1). For example, a concept might set the condition that 
the length (of an entity) is at least 4 cm. Every concept (in the field) is an element of the power 
set "P(S') of S. The set ~(S)  is denoted by C: 
c = (s) 
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The lattice structure CL = (C, =~) is a conceptual lattice with the null element 0 and universal 
element 1, if we define 
zoy ,  , z is a subset of y, 
0 = 0, (9) 
1-S .  
The set theoretical union U and intersection N are the join and meet of the conceptual lattice 
CL, respectively (see Figure 2). 
conceptual space" 
Figure 2. Conceptual space and the relationship a =~ b. 
Singletons {f} are called individual concepts, because at most one entity of the field can satisfy 
such concepts, thanks to the "identification of indiscernables" assumption. They are the "atoms" 
of the conceptual lattice CL, that is, the lattice elements immediately above the null element 0. 
Individual concepts are instances of general concepts. The relation "be an instance of a class" is 
a special case of the order relation ::~ of CL: 
Clyde ::~ elephant. 
In this system 'Clyde' denotes an atomic clement of C, and only indirectly an entity of the field 
of reality. Of course, formally, 'Clyde' denotes a singleton. 
We shall introduce two new notions, which will turn out to be very useful. The first is a new 
relation '0 '  between concepts defined as follows (see Figure 3): 
• 0y ,  , ,ny#¢.  (10) 
The expression "x 0Y" is read "x is possibly ." The relation 0 is reflexive and symmetric: 
• (11) 
zOy----- .yOz. (12) 
For example 
"mammal 0 domestic animal." 
The other new notion is a superconcept operation at/y. The expression "x/y" is read "x as a y" 
or "z qua y." Its definition is simple: 
z/y  - y, if z =~ y, otherwise z/y  = 0. (13) 
By the superconcept operation we can express interesting relations, such as 
university/organization ~ has a staff, (14) 
i.e., universities as organizations have a staff. Because the attribute-value system is so basic in 
our approach, we shall introduce a technical device to talk about them. If P is an attribute and 
a is a value, [P-a] denotes the set of S's elements which assign a to P: 
= {/ I f (P )  = ( is)  
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With this notation we can express the properties of concepts in a simple way: 
z =~ [P-a], (16) 
which means that the concept z has the property [P-a]. For example, the condition that "apples 
are red" is expressed as 
apple :~ [color-red]. 
Note that if a and b are different values, the set [P-a] N [P-b] is empty: 
a # b , [P-a] n [P-b] = 0. (IZ) 
Discussion 
It is important to specify relations of concepts in terms of intensions rather than in terms of 
extensions (see [3]). In conceptual spaces we can express concepts and their analytical relations, 
without direct reference to extensions of concepts. The basic relation =~ is an intensional rela- 
tionship between concepts. Thus, if a concept z applies to an entity and z =~ y, then clearly y 
must also apply to it. Note that in the possible worlds semantics the intensions of expressions are 
specified by their extensions in different possible worlds [4]. Note also that our modal operator 
0 is not interpreted in terms of possible worlds; rather it is a conceptual relation. 
conceptual space 
non-empty 
Figure 3. The definition of the "diamond" ~ 0 ~. 
3. INHERITANCE AND DEFAULT VALUES 
Inheritance facilities are the basic mechanism of semantic networks. Inheritance is a kind 
of inference, but it has a semantical ground in the relation ::~ and its properties. The most 
important property is transitivity: 
x~y & y~z~x~z.  (4) 
One application of transitivity is the inheritance of properties: 
The meaning of (18) lies in the fact that a subconcept z inherits a property [P-a] from its super- 
concept y. In a conceptual space S the inheritance principles (4) and (18) are valid (Figure 4). 
Default values form a special problem for every semantic network formalism. The most common 
response to the problem of default values has been to argue against classical ogical entailment. 
The argument has been that, in order to handle default values properly, a special non.monotonic 
consequence r lation is needed. As a result many very sophisticated non-classical logics have been 
developed [5]. We feel that this has been an unfortunate turn, because default logics have their 
grounds in the confusion of logic and epistemology. The very subject of logic is entailment, i.e., 
what follows logically from assumptions. It is entirely another question whether our assumptions 
A conceptual space approach 
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Figure 4. The transitivity of the relation :~. 
are known or believed! There is no good reason to give up the elegant and useful entailment 
relation. A better way is to express the status of our beliefs directly in propositions. We can 
choose either a probabilistic approach like [6] or a modal-type approach, the latter of which will 
be explored in this article. 
It seems to us that the most general fact about default values is that they are possible values. 
Of course, even more is intuitively supposed, namely that typical or normal entities have a default 
value. But from the logical point of view, a default value is one possible value. In some default 
logics the supposition of "typicality" is not used at all in derivations. (For example, in the default 
logic described in [5], the interpretation of defaults as normality is only a slogan.) Anyhow, we 
shall suggest hat a useful way to express default values in logic is via the possibility relation 0: 
• 0 [p-a]. (10) 
This formula can be read "the P of x is possibly a," such as 
cat 0 [color-black], (20) 
i.e., "the color of a cat is possibly black." Such possible properties must be contrasted with 
necessary properties: 
cat =~ [color-black], (21) 
which is to be read "tile color of a cat is necessarily black." There is a remarkable difference in 
inheritance between (20) and (21) or between (16) and (19). The condition 
z=~ y & yO[P-a] ' zO{P-a] (22) 
is not valid and neither is (23): 
x ::~ y & yO[P-a] . , z =~ [P-a]. (23) 
But we get a kind of inheritance by using the superconcept operation: 
x =~ y & y 0 [P-a] , x/y 0 [P-a], (24) 
i.e., "if x is necessarily  and y has possibly the property [P-a], so x qua y has possibly the 
property [P-a]." To understand the formula (24) it must be noted that, although x /y  = y in 
this case, the formula x /y  0 [P-a] gives us information about the relationship of x to y and the 
properties of y (Figure 5). 
Because [P-a] in (24) is a default assumption, the condition 
y0[P-a] (25) 
can be read also "the P of y is a by default." 
522 A. HAU'rAM.~K[ 
conceptual space 
Figure 5. The ilhmtratlon of the principle (24). 
4. SEMANTIC  NETWORKS AND THE LOGIC  OF  CONCEPTS 
Semantic networks are partial representations of conceptual spaces. We have to specify a 
language to talk about conceptual spaces. We shall use a kind of intensional predicate logic, a 
logic of concepts, which we shall call LC. 
The logical vocabulary of LC consists of variables and special symbols: [, ], ( , ) ,  - , / ,  =~, --, &, 
<),and=. 




= a set of concept constants: A, B, C, . .. , animal .... ,0, I, 
= a set of attributes: P, Q, R .... , color .... , 
= a set of value constants: a, b, c, ... , red, blue, .... 
Terms of LC are defined inductively: 
- concept constants are terms; 
- variables x, y, z, . . .  are terms; 
- if P is an attribute and a is a value constant, then [P-a] is a term; 
- if t and t t are terms, then (t/t') is a term. 
Formulas of LC are defined as follows: 
if t and t' are terms, then 
t ~ t I, 
t 0 t ' ,  
t =t  I, 
are (atomic) formulas; 
if p and q are formulas and z is a variable, then 
(p ~ q), 
(z)p, 
are formulas. 
A model of LC is a structure M, 
M = (V,S,F), 
where V is a (non-empty) set of values, S is a conceptual space, 
S = {f I f :  ATT--~ V}, 
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and F is an interpretation function, such that 
F(O) = ¢, 
F(1) = s,  
F(a) E V, for all a in VAL, 
F(A) E P(S), for all A in CON, 
F([P-a]) "" {f  e S I f (P)  = F(a)}, 
F(t/t') = F(t'), if F(t') contains F(t), otherwise it is 0. 
Let us suppose that, for every element e E P(S), we attach a new constant g to the language 
LC, with the stipulation that F(_.e) = e. The definition of truth of closed formulas p in the model 
M, M ~ p, is defined inductively: 
M I= t =~ t', 
M~tOt', 
M ~ t = t', 
M~p,  
M ~ p&q, 
M I= (z)p, 
iff F(t) is a subset of F(t'), 
iff F(t) 13 F(E) ~ 0, 
iff F(t) = f(t '),  
iff not M ~ p, 
iff M ~ p and M ~ q, 
iff M ~ p c[E/x] for all c E P(S), 
where pc[E/z ] denotes tile formula which we get after each free occurence of z in p is replaced by 
c. So the quantification is over concepts. 
A sentence of LC is valid, if it is true in every model M of L. Clearly, all valid formulas above 
are valid in this sense. A sentence p follows logically from a set X of sentences, if p is truc in 
every model where each sentence of X is true. These definitions are standard in logic. 
We shall adopt two special (valid) rules of inference: 
x=~y 
y : :~z  




. . . . . .  DI  (default  inher i tance) .  
, , /y 0 
In this article we don't give any axiomatization of tile concept lattice LC. Hut note that the 
axioms contain normal principles of lattices, because tile predicate =~ denotes tile lattice order 
of S. 
A semantic network SN (over tile language LC) is a set of (closed) formulas of LC. In terms of 
logic this means that semantic networks are theories. The idea is simply that a semantic network 
expresses what we believe or know about a conceptual space. A model of LC where each formula 
of a semantic network SN is true is its realization. 
A typical semantic network consists of a finite set of atomic sentences. For example: 
SN = {A :~ B, B :~ C, C ~ [P-a], C =~ [Q-b], CO[R-c]}. (27) 
In this semantic network C has necessarily properties [P-a] and [Q-b]. There is one default 
supposition: C is [R-c] by default. That A inherits properties [P-a] and [Q-b] can be inferred by 
TI. By DI we can logically infer that A qua C is [R-c] by default: 
A/C 0 [R-el. (28) 
Note that the formula (28) gives us explicitly the information we have implicitly in SN. The 
formula (28) is true, if SN is true. Of course, it is weaker than the formula A O[R-c], which one 
is allowed to infer in many default systems, but it may be false! In our system one can explore 
the conceptual structure behind the semantic network SN, entirely by sound logical inferences. 
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Discussion 
It is important o make a distinction between a conceptual structure and its representation i a 
semantic network. A representation of a structure is always incomplete and reflects the beliefs of 
the subject. This incompleteness becomes evident in our approach, in which semantic networks 
are theories (sets of formulas) and conceptual structures are identified with the models of these 
theories. 
5. APPL ICAT IONS 
We shall show that our approach solves the well known "paradoxes" of default reasoning 
without appealing to a non-standard entailment relation (see [5,6]). 
Typicality: Birds fly 
Let us consider the following set of sentences. 
Tweety is a bird. 
Penguins are birds. 
Birds normally fly. 
Penguins cannot fly. 
We can express these sentences in LC quite easily. 
(i) Tweety ~ bird. 
(ii) penguin ~ bird. 
(iii) bird Q [canfly-yes]. 
(iv) penguin :* [canfly-t~o]. 
Note that (iii) expresses a default asSUml>tion about typical birds: they can fly. 
conditions it follows that: 
(v) Tweety/bird 0 [caaily-yes], 
or that tweety as a bird can Ily by dchult. If we know that 
(vi) Tweety :* pellguin, 
we can further infer that 
(vii) Tweety =~ [canfly-no]. 
But note that conditions (v) and (vii) can both be true. 
From these 
Multiple inheritance 
Let us state a list of conditions concerning Dick. 
Quakers are normally pacifists. 
Republicans are not normally pacifists. 
Dick is both a quaker and a republican. 
Formally: 
Dick ~ quaker 
Dick ~ republican 
quaker Q pacifist 
republican O non-pacifist. 
From these conditions it follows 
Dick/quaker O pacifist 
and 
Both 
Dick/republican O non-pacifist. 
consequences are true if the conditions are true. 
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M~ed ezample 
A complex example consists of the following propositions. 
Molluscs are normally shell-bearers. 
Cephalopods must be Molhscs, but normally they are not shell-bearers. 
Nautili must be Cephalopods and must be shell-bearers. 
We can translate these conditions to the formal language roughly in the following way: 
mollusc 0 shell-bearer. 
cephalopod =:, mollusc. 
cephalopod 0 not-shell-bearer. 
nautilus =:, cephalopod. 
nautilus :~ shell-bearer. 
From these sentences we can infer that 
nautilus/cephalopod 0 not-shell-hearer, 
which is not in contradiction with "nautilus :~ shell-bearer" (see Figure 6). 
conceptual apace  
not -she l l -  
bearer 
Figure 6. The structure of the example about nautilus. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
An intensional logic of concepts is developed with which we can talk about concepts and their 
relations without referring to extensions of concepts. In this approach semantic networks are 
simply sets of formula,  i.e., they are theories in the logic of concepts. Default values are treated 
by introducing a new type of modal possibility operator and the superconcept operator, not by 
revising the basic entailment relation. In this way inheritance problems turn out to be inference 
problems, and they can be solved in sound proof theory. 
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